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Abstract:  
We propose a new approach to modeling the selection of leaders in Pashtun tribal society. 
Pashtuns are the largest tribal group in Afghanistan. In traditional Pashtun society, leadership is 
manifested as an informal power system where potential leaders gain and maintain their 
position by means of group consensus. Leadership power is spread over three areas of influence 
resulting in a triad of leadership roles. These leaders compete, vying for power and control 
based on public opinion. The addition of extremists into this system who utilize threats of harm 
to gain power disrupts the traditional system, altering the balance of power. In this research we 
implement a bounded confidence opinion dynamics model to describe the dynamics of Pashtun 
leadership selection and to describe the changes resulting from the addition of extremists to the 
system. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Understanding the culture of the Pashtun tribes in Afghanistan and Pakistan has been a challenge for 
all who interact with them, and particularly for outsiders who have attempted to occupy their 
territories. To be successful in counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, we need to have a better 
understanding of the tribal leadership dynamics. We need to understand how the structure of the social 
network, as well as local events and local changes affect leadership selection, allowing the assessment 
of the efficacy of alternate strategies. 
 
Research methods commonly used when studying social issues are not well suited to this topic. Due to 
the ongoing conflict and dangerous environment in Afghanistan, performing case studies, surveys, or 
interviews are not feasible. Distrust of outsiders is also a factor. Outdated census data and a lack of 
records on leadership succession and change make numerical analysis difficult. 
 
Simulation modeling provides a framework that is flexible enough to accommodate recent and future 
changes in tribal society and dynamics and also allow the integration of quantitative data as it becomes 
available. Opinion dynamics models capture the propagation of an opinion value across a social 
network. As individuals interact, their opinions change depending on how different those opinions are. 
This presents a suitable paradigm to examine the flow of opinions concerning potential leaders within 
a Pashtun community and the effects of changes in these opinions on the leadership balance of power. 
 
2. PASHTUN TRIBAL LEADERSHIP DYNAMICS 
 Who are the Pashtuns? Tribal myth states that all Pashtuns are descendants of a single ancestor, Qais 
Abdur Rashid (575-661), who is said to have introduced his tribe to Islam. They are located 
geographically on both sides of the Durand Line, the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
Pashtuns are primarily Sunni Muslims, they usually speak Pashto, and they practice Pashtunwali or 
“the way of the Pashtuns” (Barfield, 2010). Variations exist but in general Pashtun culture is defined 
first by Pashtunwali code of values and then by Islam. These guiding principles also indirectly 
determine much of the way in which leaders are chosen. The dominance of the Pashtuns in the 
Afghanistan/Pakistan border areas mandates that we develop a better understanding of their leadership 
dynamics. 
 
In traditional Pashtun society, the selection of leaders depends heavily on the opinion of the 
community, which can change as a result of social interactions, external events and other factors. 
Leadership or authority roles fall into three main categories: religious leadership (mullah), secular 
tribal leadership (khan), and government representation (malik). These three roles are often in 
competition for shares of status and power and their popular support may grow or dissipate depending 
on public perception. Tribal members may shift allegiance among these three leaders to gain personal 
advantage.  
 
Typically each leadership role influences a restricted area of authority. The religious leader or Mullah 
performs religious ceremonies, tends the mosque, answers religious questions and mediates disputes. 
He is often of a lower class in the community so it is his religious position that conveys power, prestige 
and respect in the community. The secular leader or Khan provides security, invites and entertains 
important visitors, provides patronage to supporters in the community, mediates disputes, has exhibited 
bravery in battle and is an example to others by his adherence to the principles of Pashtunwali and to 
Islam. A Khan often comes from an influential and relatively wealthy family whose ancestors may 
have been leaders in the past. The government representative or Malik maintains connections with 
government institutions outside the community, brings in outside work and funds, provides patronage 
to supporters, may or may not live in the community and connects the community to the 
provincial/central government. Kilcullen (Kilcullen, 2009) discusses this triad of leadership authority 
in detail.  
 
The Pashtun political system is egalitarian, at least generally speaking, and all men who own land are 
equal. There is no de facto ruling class or inherited rule. The system is acephalous in which there is no 
clearly defined leader or hierarchy. Within this system, one of the traditional qualities of a leader are 
that he is “first among equals” in keeping with an egalitarian society. A leader has no explicit power to 
coerce obedience; therefore, he must convince people that his judgment is sound and it is to their 
advantage to support his decisions. In this environment, support for a leader can quickly fade away if a 
situation changes. Most major leadership decisions are made by consensus with the tribal elders. In this 
culture, a leader retains power by providing what the community needs: security, prestige, material 
goods, dispute resolution, and assistance in avoiding blood feuds. Leadership depends heavily on the 
opinion of the community. 
 
Tribal culture and the distribution of power among the three areas of authority have undergone many 
changes in recent years (Barfield, 2010; Kilcullen, 2009). While these changes have often been as a 
result of war or civil conflict, economic pressures have also led to societal changes (Anderson, 1978) . 
The authority of tribal elders has been eroded and tribal ties have been weakened as a result of social 
upheaval. One of the most significant changes has been the influx of religious extremists such as the 
Taliban. These extremists subvert the traditional leadership dynamics, overriding group consensus 
decisions and using the threat of violence to achieve power. The result is change in the internal 
authority dynamics of the tribes. 
 Although researchers have begun to develop computational models related to leadership dynamics in 
the Afghanistan/Pakistan arena (Geller & Alam, 2010; Geller & Moss, 2008; Lustick & Miodownik, 
2009), tribal leadership dynamics in this area have not been extensively explored by the research 
community. 
 
3. OPINION DYNAMICS AND BOUNDED CONFIDENCE MODELS 
 
Opinion dynamics models simulate the way in which opinions flow over a social network such that an 
individual’s opinion is affected by his social contacts (Weisbuch, Deffuant, & Amblard, 2005). These 
models study the dynamics of agreement/disagreement among individuals. Opinions are modeled as 
variables whose dynamics are determined by social interaction. Bounded confidence models are a 
subset of opinion dynamics models that incorporate the concept of confidence, or how strongly a 
person holds their opinion. Opinions are represented on a continuum and real discussion and changes 
in opinion only occur if the opinions of those involved are sufficiently close to each other. Individuals 
in a social network interact over time and opinions change as a result of their interaction. High 
confidence tends to lower the influence of neighbors with dissimilar opinions.  
 
Opinion dynamics can be seen as a quantified model implementing the dynamics suggested by 
structural balance theory, which in part proposes that two individuals connected by a relationship with 
positive affect will tend to reach affective consensus regarding a third person or object (Cartwright & 
Harary, 1956). In this model, which extends the general Deffuant-Weisbuch (DW) algorithm 
(Deffuant, Neau, Amblard, & Weisbuch, 2000) to a directed network with neighbor averaging 
replacing randomized interactions (Moore et al., 2011), tendency towards consensus proceeds 
according to the equation: 
                    
 
    
                    
    
 
 
Where           is the opinion value of the  th individual at the next time step,       is the opinion of 
the  th individual at the current time step,    is the set of out-degree neighbors of the  th individual 
with cardinality     ,   is an out-degree neighbor of   with opinion      , and     is the plasticity value 
associated with the relationship between   and  . This model also employs the constraint of bounded 
confidence by applying the test: 
 
                     
 
Where       and       are as defined above and    is the tolerance value of the  th individual. The 
tolerance value establishes the confidence with which   holds opinion   , and establishes a bound on 
interaction and opinion updates. If the magnitude of the difference in opinions between   and   exceeds 
  , no opinion update occurs on  . 
 
4. MODELING TRIBAL LEADERSHIP SELECTION 
 
A conceptual model of tribal leadership selection abstracts the three major leadership roles and tribal 
members as nodes and their social connections as links between these nodes. Each individual holds an 
opinion of each leadership role and also has a certainty with which he holds these opinions. The social 
connections that these individuals maintain within their community define the relationships and daily 
interactions that influence their opinions of the leaders. A tribal member is assumed to support the 
leader that he holds the highest opinion of. 
 This conceptual model is instantiated as a bounded confidence opinion dynamics computational model. 
The model is constructed as a variation of the DW model as discussed above. We apply the opinion 
dynamics algorithm to an individual’s opinion relative to each of three tribal leaders. Each tribal 
member holds three distinct opinions representing their opinion of each of the potential leaders. These 
opinions are assigned randomly, drawn from a uniform distribution on the continuous interval [0, 1]. 
The highest of these three opinions determines the leader the tribal member supports.  
 
The three leaders are also each assigned three opinion values. These opinions effectively define each 
leader’s relationship with the other leaders. For example, a higher opinion of one of the other leaders 
may indicate an alliance against the third leader. 
 
In addition to opinion values, individuals are also assigned a tolerance threshold ε which defines how 
open the individual is to influence from others with differing opinions. If the difference between their 
opinions exceeds ε, then there is no interaction and no change in either opinion.  
 
The DW model is applied to a directed social network. We create a series of random scale-free 
networks using preferential attachment (Barabasi & Albert, 1999). Three nodes of the network are 
assigned to the three leadership roles. These individuals are well-connected and have an outdegree of 
0, so while they influence others’ opinions their own opinions do not change. 
 
The model represents a social network of tribal members who are seeking a consensus on leadership 
for the community. When the model is run over time, at each time step, each tribal member interacts 
with his social contacts and adjusts his opinion values closer to the mean of his contacts. In the results 
presented here, we consider each opinion to propagate independently, such that an opinion increase or 
decrease relative to one leader does not have an effect on the absolute opinions associated with the 
other two leaders. When equilibrium is reached, the leader with the majority of high opinions is the 
consensus leader.  
 
The leadership selection model described to this point represents an idealized traditional situation. The 
addition of extremists such as members of the Taliban has altered this traditional balance of power. To 
model the subsequent effects of this type of change, we make several modifications to the network. A 
node is added to the social network that is attached to the religious leadership role. This node is 
assigned opinion values that represent strong support of the religious leader and little or no support for 
the other leaders. The ability of this extremist to influence the opinion of the religious leader will serve 
to radicalize this leader over time. We also adjust the plasticity value µ of the other two leaders’ 
relationships to indicate the inhibiting effects of the extremist’s threats of violence. This reduces the 
ability of the non-religious leaders to influence opinions. After these changes have been made to the 
network, the model is again run over time and the consensus leader identified. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates a social network after the addition of a religious extremist. The extremist is 
connected to and influences the opinion of the religious leader or Mullah. The other two leaders, the 
secular leader or Khan and the government agent or Malik experience a reduction in their ability to 
influence opinions due to the threats of violence. Links marked with blue circles have a reduction in 
plasticity µ.   
 
 
 
5. PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
 
As an initial exploration, 100 networks were generated, each containing a total of 100 nodes. Each 
node was added to the network with preferential attachment of five edges. The leadership nodes were 
assigned opinion values of themselves of 0.85 and 0.25 towards the other two leaders. In all figures, 
green nodes support the Mullah, yellow nodes support the Malik, and red nodes support the Khan. The 
larger nodes represent the leadership nodes. 
 
Figure 2 displays a generated network with initial opinion values. Nodes are approximately evenly 
split between the three leadership nodes. Figure 3 shows this network after equilibrium has been 
reached. In this instance, both the Mullah and the Khan have gained followers while the Malik has lost 
a significant number of followers. 
 
                    
                       
 
Figure 3: Network at equilibrium. Leadership 
selections:  
Mullah – 48 (green) 
Malik – 7 (yellow) 
Khan – 48 (red) 
Figure 2: Network with initial opinion 
values. Leadership selections:  
Mullah – 33 (green) 
Malik – 31 (yellow) 
Khan – 39 (red) 
Figure 1: Social network indicating leaders, extremist, and links experiencing a decrease 
in plasticity µ due to addition of the extremist to the network. Figure 4 shows the same network at equilibrium after the addition of the Taliban extremist. The 
Mullah has now gained additional supporters and both the Malik and Khan have lost supporters. 
Because the Mullah now has the majority of followers, he is the consensus leader. Figure 5 displays 
the evolution of the number of supporters for each leadership role over the length of the simulation run. 
The first plateau corresponds to the first equilibrium. Then the Taliban extremist is added to the 
network and the second equilibrium reached. 
 
                  
                    
 
Figures 6 – 8 graph the opinion history of the nodes of the network for all three opinions. As in Figure 
5, the first equilibrium is visible as well as subsequent changes after the addition of the extremist. 
 
           
          
 
Figure 9 charts the count of networks selecting each type of leader initially, at equilibrium, and after 
the addition of the Taliban extremist. Addition of the extremist increases the influence of the Mullah 
and as a result he is much more likely to be selected as the leader. Figure 10 displays the average 
number of nodes in a network selecting each type of leader. Again, note that adding the extremist 
increases the average number of supporters of the Mullah. 
 
Figure 8: Khan opinion history  Figure 7: Malik opinion history  Figure 6: Mullah opinion history 
Figure 5: Opinion counts for one simulation 
run. The first plateau is at equilibrium. Then 
the extremist is added and the second 
equilibrium is reached. 
 
Figure 4: Network at equilibrium after 
addition of extremist. Leadership selections:  
Mullah – 59 (green) 
Malik – 4 (yellow) 
Khan – 41 (red)             
                 
 
6. ANALYSIS 
 
The preliminary results presented above represent a small initial sampling of simulated networks.  
The effects of the addition of an extremist to the network is evident based on the number of networks 
selecting the Mullah as the consensus leader. There are a small number of networks that did not move 
to select the Mullah as leader. These networks will be analyzed for characteristics that aid in resisting 
radicalization by the Taliban and the Mullah. Sensitivity analysis will be performed on the change in µ 
to determine the level of significance. We will also examine whether removal of the Taliban extremist 
results in a return to the original steady state. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this research we explore the use of an opinion dynamics bounded confidence model to simulate 
tribal leadership selection among the Pashtun tribes. The preliminary results and analysis demonstrate 
the value of this approach. The model accurately reflects the triad of authority roles and the even 
distribution of leader selection if left unmodified. The model also shows the unbalancing effect of the 
addition of an extremist to the social network and the subsequent tipping of power to the Mullah. 
 
8. FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The purpose of this model is to aid in understanding the social dynamics of leadership selection in 
Pashtun tribal society and the effects of extremists on the traditional consensus selection of leaders. In 
the absence of specific information about the composition of Pashtun social networks, we have used 
random networks with the characteristics of typical social networks. As information becomes available 
concerning the tribal social networks, this information can be incorporated into the network generation 
process. 
 
The model also has the potential to analyze metrics defining political power, explore the effects of 
extremism in tribal members, examine the effects of loss of a leader and how possible replacements 
might be identified, and ultimately phase in quantitative data such as demographics, social 
connections, spatial locations, external events, and individual movement.  
 
This model represents an ideal of the historical leadership situation. Recent events have disrupted 
and/or altered this dynamic in multiple ways depending on location. Adapting this model to 
accommodate other leadership configurations and including other pressures influencing opinions such 
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Figure 10: Average number of nodes selecting each 
leader initially, at equilibrium, and after the addition 
of the Taliban extremist. 
Figure 9: Number of network runs selecting each 
leader initially, at equilibrium, and after the 
addition of the Taliban extremist. as the loss of current or potential leaders, the effects of an influx of money, etc. may also be helpful 
and add insight. 
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